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47 
Community Parenting 
Laura T. Kessler* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
How does the law, or should the law, define parenthood? 
Traditionally, the legal category parent has been reserved for 
biological or adoptive parents. Significant social, economic, and 
scientific developments have strained this definition, however. 
Today’s families are characterized by increased fluidity, a loosening 
of the state’s hold on family life, and the delegation of caregiving 
tasks to individuals and institutions outside the formal, legal family.1 
These changes have sparked a debate about whether the law’s 
traditional definition of parenthood should be expanded. 
Some scholars, motivated by conservative religious values,2 the 
benefits of certainty in the law,3 or constitutional privacy,4 advocate 
retention of status-based definitions of parenthood. Others, driven by  
 
 * Professor of Law, University of Utah. Many thanks to Susan Appleton, Martha 
Ertman, Maya Manian, Julie Nice, Laura Rosenbury, and Matthew Weinstein for their helpful 
comments; to the Washington University Journal of Law & Policy for inviting me to participate 
in this symposium; and to the S.J. Quinney College of Law summer research program for 
financial support. All rights reserved September 25, 2007. 
 1. See MARY ANN GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY 3–4 (1981). 
 2. See, e.g., William C. Duncan, “Don’t Ever Take a Fence Down”: The “Functional” 
Definition of Family—Displacing Marriage in Family Law, 3 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 57, 77 (2001); 
cf. Lynn D. Wardle, Deconstructing Family: A Critique of the American Law Institute’s 
“Domestic Partners” Proposal, 2001 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1189, 1228–29, 1233 (citing morality and 
tradition). 
 3. See, e.g., June Carbone, The Legal Definition of Parenthood: Uncertainty at the Core 
of Family Identity, 65 LA. L. REV. 1295, 1295 (2005). 
 4. See, e.g., John DeWitt Gregory, Family Privacy and the Custody and Visitation Rights 
of Adult Outsiders, 36 FAM. L.Q. 163, 184–87 (2002). 
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equality concerns,5 less robust notions of family privacy,6 contract,7 
and other theories,8 support definitions of parenthood expansive 
enough to encompass adults who function as “psychological 
parents”9 to children.10 Despite this split over whether the law should 
narrowly define parenthood, many people across the political 
spectrum seem to accept the prevailing legal rule that a child shall not 
concurrently have more than two legal parents.11 Whatever their 
 
 5. See, e.g., Peggy Cooper Davis, The Good Mother: A New Look at Psychological 
Parent Theory, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 347, 358–59 (1996) (arguing that cultural 
diversity and rejection of the “omnipotent” mother call for maintaining children’s relationships 
with multiple caregivers); Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining 
Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional 
Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459, 486 (1990). 
 6. See, e.g., David D. Meyer, Partners, Care Givers, and the Constitutional Substance of 
Parenthood, in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY 60–65 (Robin Fretwell Wilson ed., 2006). 
 7. See, e.g., Katharine K. Baker, Bargaining or Biology? The History and Future of 
Paternity Law and Parental Status, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 38–43 (2004). 
 8. See Elizabeth Bartholet, Guiding Principles for Picking Parents, 27 HARV. WOMEN’S 
L.J. 323, 326–27, 338 (2004) (advocating a multi-factor test that accounts for gestation, 
genetics, intent, whether the child is born in the context of marriage, the existence of a 
parenting relationship, and potential permanence); Margaret F. Brinig, Troxel and the Limits of 
Community, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 733, 764 (2000) (suggesting that a functional parent should 
receive rights under the limited circumstances where she “has been performing the same role as 
biological parents usually do”); Emily Buss, “Parental” Rights, 88 VA. L. REV. 635, 674 
(2002) (asserting that states “should be free to assign parental rights based on a genetic, 
gestational, or contractual relationship, or on any other grounds not otherwise constitutionally 
prohibited”); Karen Czapanskiy, Interdependencies, Families, and Children, 39 SANTA CLARA 
L. REV. 957, 963 (1999) (advocating the use of “interdependency theory” to determine child 
custody, which looks to “the fundamental connection of the child to the specific person or 
people who care for the child every day because they have a long term commitment to the 
child’s development and well being”); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A 
Child-Centered Perspective on Parents’ Rights, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1747, 1749 (1993) 
(advocating a “generist” perspective on parenthood, which would recognize as legal parents 
those who commit to and nurture children). 
 9. See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ANNA FREUD & ALFRED SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST 
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 17–20 (1973) (formulating “psychological parent” concept). 
 10. These definitions vary widely in their theoretical underpinnings and expansiveness, 
but they all would recognize functional parents to a greater or lesser extent under certain 
circumstances. See sources cited supra note 8. 
 11. See Baker, supra note 7, at 48–49; Bartholet, supra note 8, at 342–43; Brinig, supra 
note 8, at 774–79; Buss, supra note 8, at 665–66; Duncan, supra note 2, at 75; David M. 
Wagner, Balancing “Parents Are” and “Parents Do” in the Supreme Court’s 
Constitutionalized Family Law: Some Implications for the ALI Proposals on De Facto 
Parenthood, 2001 BYU L. REV. 1175, 1184. For a few notable exceptions, see Katharine T. 
Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal Alternatives When 
the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879 passim (1984); Naomi R. 
Cahn, Reframing Child Custody Decisionmaking, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 44–47 (1997); Melanie B. 
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disagreements, the participants in this discourse about parenthood 
also have justified their positions primarily on what they see as the 
needs and interests of children.12 
In this Article I do not directly engage this debate, opting instead 
to change its parameters and focus. I have two aims: First, I seek to 
understand why, at a time of increasing recognition of non-traditional 
families, the “more-than-two” parent family is so widely agreed to be 
undesirable, even while so many people practice alternatives to the 
two-parent nuclear family norm.13 Second, I seek to move away from 
derivative, child-focused justifications for expanding the existing 
legal definition of parent. Instead, I argue for an explicit examination 
of gender politics. Such an analysis can provide an enriched 
understanding of functional parenthood. Identity and ideology are 
already present in contemporary conversations about how best to 
define parenthood and parental rights. The current singular focus on 
children’s best interests merely serves to obscure these important 
subtexts. 
Part II of this Article sets the stage for a discussion of the more-
than-two-parent family—what I will call community parenting14—by 
reviewing social science research demonstrating the prevalence of 
community parenting. In reviewing this literature, Part II also reveals 
how political discourses over divorce, cohabitation, single-
parenthood, and same-sex marriage systematically mask the extent of 
community parenting in our society. Part III examines the law’s 
response to community parenting. It analyzes the current treatment of 
community parenting in the context of three types of custody 
 
Jacobs, My Two Dads: Disaggregating Biological and Social Paternity, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 809 
(2006); David D. Meyer, Family Ties: Solving the Constitutional Dilemma of the Faultless 
Father, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 753 (1999); cf. Davis, supra note 5, at 370 (advocating the use of 
various legal arrangements short of parenthood that would facilitate cooperative caregiving 
networks). 
 12. See sources cited supra notes 2–8; see also Robin Fretwell Wilson, Undeserved Trust: 
Reflections on the ALI’s Treatment of De Facto Parents, in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY 90, 
90–120 (Robin Fretwell Wilson ed., 2006). 
 13. This question is a revised version of the one asked by Elizabeth Emens in her article 
critiquing the two-person numerosity requirement for marriage. See Elizabeth F. Emens, 
Monogamy’s Law: Compulsory Monogamy and Polyamorous Existence, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & 
SOC. CHANGE 277 (2004). 
 14. Other possible terms include multiple parenting, multi-party parenting, democratic 
parenting, plural parenting, non-exclusive parenting, or non-nuclear parenting. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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disputes: those involving non-marital fathers, surrogacy, and the 
dissolution of same-sex relationships. This review of the law in a 
range of areas highlights the degree to which the numerosity 
requirement that a child shall have no more than two parents is 
assumed and enforced in our law. Part IV presents several arguments 
for lifting this limitation. Among other potential benefits, recognizing 
more than two legal parents holds significant potential to deconstruct 
traditional gender and sexuality norms. Finally, Part V briefly 
reviews a number of potential legal reforms that would follow were 
we to lift the numerosity requirement with regard to parenthood. 
More broadly, this Article embraces difference and diversity in 
family life. This approach stands in contrast to the two approaches 
that have dominated legal and academic projects surrounding non-
nuclear families. The first approach, demonizing difference, seeks to 
characterize as dysfunctional, disorganized, and deviant those 
families that do not conform with the nuclear, heterosexual, male-
breadwinner, female-homemaker ideal. For example, the African-
American family has historically been studied as a pathological form 
of social organization.15 According to this perspective, non-marital 
childbearing, female household headship, and welfare dependency 
among African-American families are seen as the causes of poverty, 
low educational attainment, unemployment, and crime.16 Today, we 
see a similar field of interest developing with regard to the supposed 
dysfunctionality of gay and lesbian families.17 More generally, the 
“demonizing difference” approach to non-nuclear families can be 
seen in discourses over cohabitation, divorce, welfare, and same-sex 
marriage. 
The second approach, downplaying difference, is typically 
achieved through descriptive projects portraying non-nuclear families 
as just like nuclear families, or through prescriptive projects 
suggesting that the purported problems of the non-nuclear family 
 
 15. See, e.g., Daniel Patrick Moynihan, The Negro Family: The Case for National Action, 
in THE MOYNIHAN REPORT AND THE POLITICS OF CONTROVERSY 39–124 (Lee Rainwater & 
William L. Yancey eds., 1967). 
 16. Id. For a contemporary critique of this trend, see Martha L. Fineman, Images of 
Mothers in Poverty Discourses, 1991 DUKE L.J. 274. 
 17. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 998–1001 (Mass. 2003) 
(Cordy, J., dissenting) (reviewing studies). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol24/iss1/5
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would be solved by embracing traditional nuclear-family lifestyles or 
circumstances. For example, in the context of debates in the 1960s 
and 1970s about the Black Family, much research was dedicated to 
demonstrating that socioeconomic position was the cause of black 
families’ troubles.18 Such explanations suggested that if African-
American families were not disproportionately poor, their family 
values and structures would be similar to those of white Americans. 
Along the same lines, advocates of same-sex marriage and gay family 
rights more generally have sought to portray same-sex relationships 
as just like heterosexual ones,19 and legal victories in these areas have 
been purchased largely on this theory.20 This reasoning is also 
prevalent in debates about the decline of the American family more 
generally. For example, opponents of conservative initiatives to 
restrict divorce21 and promote marriage22 have sought to diminish the 
effects of unmarried parenthood on children, suggesting that there are 
essentially no differences in the parenting practices or developmental 
outcomes for children in traditional nuclear and unmarried-parent 
families.23 Downplaying difference is an understandable response to 
 
 18. See, e.g., JOHN H. SCANZONI, BLACK FAMILIES IN AMERICA (1977); Frank F. 
Furstenberg, Jr. et al., The Origins of the Female-Headed Black Family: The Impact of the 
Urban Experience, 6 J. INTERDISC. HIST. 211, 221–22 (1975). 
 19. See Judith Stacey & Timothy J. Biblarz, (How) Does the Sexual Orientation of 
Parents Matter?, 66 AM. SOC. REV. 159, 162–64 (2001) (discussing this tendency among 
researchers of same-sex relationships). 
 20. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 569–70, 574 (2003) (constructing the 
liberty interest at stake as the protection of committed relationships); Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 
949 (providing a lengthy description of the traditional lifestyle of the fourteen individual 
plaintiffs, focusing on details such as the length of their relationships, the presence of children, 
and church attendance). 
 21. See D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW 538–
39 (2006) (discussing efforts by states to limit divorce through devices such as covenant 
marriage, lengthy waiting periods, mandatory marital counseling, mediation, and arbitration). 
 22. See, e.g., Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 
42 U.S.C. § 601(a)(2) (2000) (stating that one the welfare law’s purposes is to “end the 
dependence of needy parents on government benefits by promoting job preparation, work, and 
marriage”). For discussions of the legal and political movement to promote marriage in the 
United States, including more recent developments, see Anita Bernstein, For and Against 
Marriage: A Revision, 102 MICH. L. REV. 129, 153–59 (2003); Brenda Cossman, Contesting 
Conservatisms, Family Feuds and the Privatization of Dependency, 13 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. 
POL’Y & L. 415 (2005); Angela Onwuachi-Willig, The Return of the Ring: Welfare Reform’s 
Marriage Cure as the Revival of Post-Bellum Control, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1647 (2005); Noah 
Zatz, Welfare to What?, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1131 (2006). 
 23. See, e.g., E. MAVIS HETHERINGTON & JOHN KELLY, FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE: 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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the othering effect of the demonizing difference approach to non-
nuclear families, but its effect is to assimilate minority families into 
traditional norms. 
While seemingly contradictory, both of these theoretical 
frameworks for understanding non-nuclear families constrain 
intellectual development on several fronts. They deny the legitimacy 
of minority cultural forms. They hide a range of potentially positive, 
functional practices that occur within non-nuclear families that 
scholars of the family and policymakers should be interested in 
knowing more about. The methodologies of demonizing and 
downplaying difference also obscure the diversity of arrangements 
and practices among non-nuclear families. 
Departing from these approaches, this Article seeks to explore 
some of the qualitative differences in parenting practices among non-
nuclear families. Such an approach has two advantages. First, 
attention to these differences is likely to suggest less oppressive legal 
rules with regard to individuals in non-nuclear families. This 
important project is briefly addressed in Part V. Second, and more 
broadly, placing non-normative families and parenting practices at 
the center of our analyses of the family may work to denaturalize the 
normative nuclear family. Instead of studying the supposed problems 
of the non-nuclear family by holding it up to the standards of 
married, two-parent, white, heterosexual families, what insights 
might emerge if we did the reverse?  
There are many possible insights produced by this methodology, 
but the one I will focus on here is the potential of community 
parenting to undermine traditional gender roles and intensive 
mothering standards, which dominate the normative nuclear family. 
As a preliminary thought experiment that seeks to explore one small, 
potentially positive aspect of community parenting—gender non-
normativity—this Article does not seek to work out in any detailed 
fashion a set of legal rules for defining or regulating community 
parenting. That project, which could surely build on the ideas 
explored here, is left for another day. With these theoretical 
 
DIVORCE RECONSIDERED (2002).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol24/iss1/5
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commitments in mind, the next section examines the prevalence of 
community parenting practices in American society. 
II. THE PREVALENCE OF COMMUNITY PARENTING 
A. Social Science Research 
Children today often do not live in nuclear families,24 even though 
the nuclear family25 remains a normative ideal within family law and 
American culture more broadly.26 In 2005 almost one-third of 
American children did not live with two natural or adoptive parents.27 
If we take a longitudinal view, the trend away from the traditional 
family is even more apparent: about half of American children will 
spend a least some time in an unmarried-parent family before the age 
of eighteen.28 These statistics are driven by a number of by now well-
known developments. 
Although divorce rates have remained relatively constant for more 
than two decades, recent estimates suggest that almost half of all first 
marriages will end in divorce.29 Yet marriage remains a robust 
institution in our society, particularly for white, middle-class 
individuals, resulting in the widespread existence of step-families.30 
 
 24. See Laura T. Kessler, Transgressive Caregiving, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2005). 
 25. George Murdock defined the nuclear family as “a social group characterised by 
common residence, economic cooperation and reproduction. It contains adults of both sexes, at 
least two of whom maintain a socially approved sexual relationship, and one or more children, 
own or adopted, of the sexually cohabiting adults.” GEORGE MURDOCK, SOCIAL STRUCTURE 1 
(1949). 
 26. See STEPHANIE COONTZ, THE WAY WE NEVER WERE (1992). 
 27. See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, LIVING ARRANGEMENTS OF CHILDREN UNDER 18 
YEARS OLD: 1960 TO PRESENT 1–2 (2006), available at http://www.census.gov/population/ 
socdemo/hh-fam/ch1.pdf. 
 28. See Larry L. Bumpass & James A. Sweet, Children’s Experience in Single-Parent 
Families: Implications of Cohabitation and Marital Transitions, 21 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 256, 
256 (1989); Larry L. Bumpass & R. Kelly Raley, Redefining Single-Parent Families: 
Cohabitation and Changing Family Reality, 32 DEMOGRAPHY 97, 97 (1995). 
 29. Robert Schoen & Nicola Standish, The Retrenchment of Marriage: Results from 
Marital Status Life Tables for the United States, 1995, 27 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 553, 556 
tbl.1 (2001) (reporting that 43% to 44% of marriages ended in divorce in 1995); Robert Schoen 
& Vladimir Canudas-Romo, Timing Effects on Divorce: 20th Century Experience in the United 
States, 68 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 749, 755 tbl.2 (2006) (reporting a 45% chance that a marriage 
would end in divorce in 2000). 
 30. See Larry L. Bumpass et al., The Changing Character of Stepfamilies: Implications of 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Opposite-sex cohabitation—whether as an alternative, prequel, or 
sequel to marriage—has grown from a criminalized, deviant 
behavior31 to a common experience of adults in our country.32 In 
2003, more than four-and-a-half million couples cohabited outside of 
marriage.33 Children were present in about forty percent of those 
households.34 This percentage approximates the share of married-
partner households with children.35 Marriage and re-marriage rates 
have declined significantly, offset in large part by cohabitation.36 
Non-marital childbearing is common,37 fueled by changing social 
norms and the elimination of legal distinctions based on legitimacy.38 
Along the same lines, the successes of the gay rights movement in the 
area of parental rights39 and advances in alternative reproduction 
have led to a significant increase in the number of children raised in 
households with a gay or lesbian parent.40 By definition, children of 
 
Cohabitation and Nonmarital Childbearing, 32 DEMOGRAPHY 425, 426 (1995). 
 31. See Martha L. Fineman, Law and Changing Patterns of Behavior: Sanctions on Non-
Marital Cohabitation, 1981 WIS. L. REV. 275, 276. 
 32. See Bumpass et al., supra note 30, at 426; Andrew J. Cherlin, American Marriage in 
the Early Twenty-First Century, 15 FUTURE CHILD. 33, 35 (2005). 
 33. See JASON FIELDS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, AMERICA’S FAMILIES AND LIVING 
ARRANGEMENTS: 2003, CURRENT POPULATION REP. P20-553, at 16 (2004). 
 34. Id. at 17. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Bumpass et al., supra note 30, at 426. 
 37. Cherlin, supra note 32, at 35 (about one-third of all births are to unmarried women). 
 38. See Pickett v. Brown, 416 U.S. 1, 7–11 (1983) (discussing long line of Supreme Court 
cases striking down classifications based on legitimacy).  
 39. For example, the majority of states no longer take into account the sexual orientation 
of a parent in custody disputes. See Kessler, supra note 24, at 30 (reviewing cases). This 
approach, known as the “nexus test,” makes the sexual orientation of a parent irrelevant unless 
there is evidence that it will negatively impact the best interests of the child. Id. at 30–31. Along 
the same lines, more than ten states and the District of Columbia now recognize “second-
parent” adoption, which is the right of the partner of a biological parent to adopt without 
terminating the parental rights of the biological parent, thereby ensuring legal ties between 
children and both their lesbian or gay parents where the parents seek to formalize the 
relationship. Id. at 31. And in 2000, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws revised the Uniform Parentage Act of 1973, governing in part the status of children 
born through donor insemination, to remove bias in favor of married couples. See UNIF. 
PARENTAGE ACT § 702, 9B U.L.A. 45, cmt. (Supp. 2002). Although not revised explicitly with 
lesbians in mind, the change was made “in light of . . . the constitutional protections of the 
procreative rights of unmarried as well as married women.” Id. 
 40. Somewhere between one million and nine million children in the United States have at 
least one gay or lesbian parent. See Stacey & Biblarz, supra note 19, at 164 (discussing the 
different definitions of “gay” that affect this estimate). See generally LAURA BENKOV, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol24/iss1/5
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same-sex partners live in unmarried-parent families, except in one 
state,41 and are related biologically to only one parent in their 
household. Finally, worsening economic inequality in the United 
States and the consequent disruption of familial ties has expanded the 
number of children being raised by foster parents or other temporary 
caretakers.42 By definition or circumstance, children in these 
situations often develop significant relationships with adults outside 
the traditional nuclear family. This is now widely recognized both by 
those who advocate a more expansive definition of parenthood and 
those who oppose it,43 and the law is slowly but surely moving 
toward a functional definition of parenthood. 
What has been less apparent in the discourses surrounding 
divorce, cohabitation, “single-parenthood,” and gay family rights, 
however, is the extent to which children today may have significant 
family ties to more than two adults concurrently. Most obviously, the 
formal addition of step-parents to a family through remarriage often 
results in three or four adults across households who may have 
significant financial and emotional ties to a child, at least in part. 
However, looking only to divorce and remarriage may seriously 
underestimate the prevalence of these arrangements, because a 
significant portion of divorced parents forgo remarriage in favor of 
cohabitation.44 Like married parents, unmarried cohabitant parents 
may break up and form new cohabiting relationships. When we 
include these informal “step-families,” the step-family experience is 
far more widespread than most discussions of blended families 
 
REINVENTING THE FAMILY: THE EMERGING STORY OF LESBIAN AND GAY PARENTS 34–81 
(1994) (documenting the increase in childbearing and childrearing among lesbians and gay 
men). 
 41. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969–70 (Mass. 2003). 
 42. See Sandra Bass et al., Children, Families, and Foster Care: Analysis and 
Recommendations, 14 FUTURE CHILD. 5, 8 (2004) (finding that the number of children in foster 
care nearly doubled from 1980 to 1998). For the racial dimensions of this problem, see 
DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE (2002). 
 43. Compare BEYOND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: A NEW STRATEGIC VISION FOR ALL OUR 
FAMILIES & RELATIONSHIPS (2006), available at http://www.beyondmarriage.org/Beyond 
Marriage.pdf, with DAN CERE, COUNCIL ON FAMILY LAW, THE FUTURE OF FAMILY LAW: LAW 
AND THE MARRIAGE CRISIS IN NORTH AMERICA 33–40 (2005), available at http://www. 
marriagedebate.com/pdf/future_of_family_law.pdf. 
 44. See Bumpass et al., supra note 30, at 426. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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suggest.45 Using this more accurate definition of step-families, nearly 
one-third of all children are likely to spend some time in a step-
family before the age of eighteen.46 Like children in formal step-
families formed through marriage, children in cohabitant stepfamilies 
often develop significant parent-child relationships with more than 
two adults across households. 
Community parenting occurs in other contexts as well. For 
example, more Americans than ever have grandparents who are 
alive,47 and there is evidence that ties between grandparents and 
grandchildren have become stronger over the past half-century.48 
Moreover, research shows that grandparents are more involved with 
their grandchildren when parents are divorced, especially maternal 
grandparents, given the norm of maternal custody.49 As two leading 
sociologists of the family note, “intergenerational ties are often latent 
in the kinship system” until a crisis occurs.50 Thus,“[f]ar from 
uniformly destroying the bonds of kinship, divorce appears to 
strengthen intergenerational ties along the maternal line. As a result, 
children of divorced parents may have stronger ties to some of their 
grandparents than children from nondisrupted marriages have to any 
of their grandparents.”51 Remarriage of a parent does not appear to 
 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 425. 
 47. Merril Silverstein & Jeffrey D. Long, Trajectories of Grandparents’ Perceived 
Solidarity with Adult Grandchildren: A Growth Curve Analysis over 23 Years, 60 J. MARRIAGE 
& FAM. 912, 912 (1998). 
 48. See COONTZ, supra note 26, at 15; Chrystal C. Ramirez Barranti, The 
Grandparent/Grandchild Relationship: Family Resource in an Era of Voluntary Bonds, 34 
FAM. REL. 343, 343–44, 346–48 (1985). 
 49. Thomas E. Denham & Craig W. Smith, The Influence of Grandparents on 
Grandchildren: A Review of the Literature and Resources, 38 FAM. REL. 345, 347–48 (1989). 
 50. ANDREW J. CHERLIN & FRANK F. FURSTENBERG, JR., THE NEW AMERICAN 
GRANDPARENT 163–64 (1986). 
 51. Id. at 164. For example, according Cherlin & Furstenberg: 
Among all maternal grandparents, those in disrupted families were more likely to be 
living with the study child or to be seeing that child almost every day, were more 
likely to be exchanging services, were more likely to be providing financial support to 
the child’s parents, and were much more likely to be engaging in parentlike behavior. 
Id. at 151–52. Indeed, approximately one-third of maternal grandparents on the side of the 
parent with physical custody were seeing their grandchild or grandchildren at least two to three 
times a week, and approximately two-thirds were exchanging services and engaging in regular 
parentlike behavior. These figures represent approximately double the contact and parental 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol24/iss1/5
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affect the increased frequency of contact between children and their 
maternal grandparents after divorce,52 potentially resulting in three or 
more adults across households and generations who are substantially 
involved in a child’s life. 
But even this expansive accounting of the complex variety of 
parenting arrangements that arise in the wake of family dissolution 
and re-formation does not fully account for the prevalence of 
community parenting. For example, in certain minority communities, 
care relationships extend well beyond the sexual family as a matter of 
course, often involving numerous social kin in care work. For 
example, for a set of complex reasons, including the history of 
American slavery and its aftermath,53 the influence of African 
cultural traditions,54 and economic necessity,55 the practice of 
“othermothering” is common in the African-American community.56 
Othermothers are women who assist blood mothers by sharing 
mothering responsibilities.57 They can be but are not confined to such 
blood relatives as grandmothers, sisters, aunts, cousins, or supportive 
fictive kin.58 More broadly, African Americans are more likely than 
white Americans to rely on relatives and fictive kin for practical 
support, such help with transportation, housework, and child care.59  
 
involvement of all other grandparents. Id. at 250 tbl.A-7. 
 52. Id. at 148–49. 
 53. EDWARD FRANKLIN FRAZIER, THE NEGRO FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES (1939); 
Angela Davis, Reflections on the Black Woman’s Role in the Community of Slaves, 3 BLACK 
SCHOLAR 2, 7–8 (1971). 
 54. W.E.B. DU BOIS, THE NEGRO AMERICAN FAMILY (1909); Antonio McDaniel, 
Historical Racial Differences in Living Arrangements of Children, 19 J. FAM. HIST. 57, 69 
(1994); Wade Nobles, Africanity: Its Role in Black Families, 5 BLACK SCHOLAR 10, 11 (1974); 
Niara Sudarkasa, African and Afro-American Family Structure: A Comparison, 11 BLACK 
SCHOLAR 37, 57 (1980). 
 55. See FRAZIER, supra note 53; Walter Allen, African American Family Life in Societal 
Context: Crisis and Hope, 10 SOC. FORUM 569 (1995); Frank F. Furstenberg et al., supra note 
18, at 221; Twila L. Perry, Race Matters: Change, Choice, and Family Law at the Millennium, 
33 FAM. L.Q. 461, 464–65 (1999) (identifying the shortage of black men at every age group and 
the precarious economic situation of many black men as critical factors affecting black 
women’s low marriage rates).  
 56. See Patricia Hill Collins, The Meaning of Motherhood in Black Culture and Black 
Mother/Daughter Relationships, 4 SAGE 3, 4–5 (1987). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Natalia Sarkisian & Naomi Gerstel, Kin Support Among Blacks and Whites: Race and 
Family Organization, 69 AM. SOC. REV. 812, 812 (2004). Whites are more likely to be involved 
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Moreover, the persistence of the male-breadwinner ideal, which 
historically has been realized for only a small percentage of families 
(that is, mostly white, privileged families),60 obscures the ways in 
which non-marital fathers continue to be involved in the lives of their 
children in minority and low-income communities, along with other 
biological and fictive kin. For example, although many low-income 
men do not provide regular, formal child support payments, research 
has found that they contribute to the support of their children through 
substantial, if irregular, cash payments,61 as well as by spending time 
with their children62 and by providing them with gifts and 
necessities.63 Conceptions of fatherhood that are centered primarily 
on a man’s ability to financially support his family in the form of 
earned wages consistent with the “good provider role”64 miss the 
extent to which nonresidential fathers remain in children’s lives in 
minority and low income communities, along with other biological 
and fictive kin. 
Along the same lines, lesbians and gay men often engage in care 
practices involving social kin.65 For example, a gay family of choice 
may include lovers, ex-lovers, friends, co-parents, gamete-donors, 
and children brought into the family through adoption, foster care, 
prior heterosexual relationships, and alternative reproduction.66 Like 
the tradition of othermothering within the African-American 
community, gay families of choice are made up of fluid networks that 
have different purposes—including emotional support, economic 
 
in exchanges of financial and emotional support. Id. 
 60. See JUDITH STACEY, IN THE NAME OF THE FAMILY: RETHINKING FAMILY VALUES IN 
THE POSTMODERN AGE 30, 40, 42–43 (1996) (discussing the failure of the male breadwinner 
ideal for working class men and men of color, because these men could not typically support 
their families on a single wage). 
 61. See KATHRYN EDIN & LAURA LEIN, MAKING ENDS MEET: HOW SINGLE MOTHERS 
SURVIVE WELFARE AND LOW-WAGE WORK 158–64 (1997); Sanford L. Braver et al., 
Noncustodial Parent’s Report of Child Support Payments, 40 FAM. REL. 180, 182–84 (1991). 
 62. See Jennifer F. Hamer, The Fathers of “Fatherless” Black Children, 78 FAM. SOC’Y 
564, 569–70 (1997). 
 63. EDIN & LEIN, supra note 61, at 164–65. Nonresidential boyfriends also provide cash 
and in-kind assistance to low-income unmarried mothers. Id. at 154–58. 
 64. Jessie Bernard, The Good Provider Role: Its Rise and Fall, 36 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1 
(1981). 
 65. See KATH WESTON, FAMILIES WE CHOOSE 2 (Richard D. Mohr et al. eds., 1991). 
 66. Id. at 3, 31, 111–12. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol24/iss1/5
p 47 Kessler book pages.doc  9/26/2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2007]  Community Parenting 59 
 
 
cooperation, socialization, reproduction, consumption, and 
sexuality—which overlap but are not coterminous.67 And like the 
community parenting practices in communities of color, biological 
fathers are increasingly playing an active role in the parenting of 
children of lesbian mothers, becoming a “junior partner in the 
parenting team.”68 
B. How Political Discourses Hide Community Parenting 
As the trends reviewed here demonstrate, the modern family is 
increasingly characterized by a complex network of kinship ties that 
link individuals across households and from generation to generation. 
Within this context, community parenting is widely practiced. Yet its 
prevalence is hidden by legal and political discourses that conceive 
contemporary families only in relation to an idealized, two-parent 
norm. In these discourses, unmarried parents are referred to as 
“single.”69 Modern families are described as “broken,”70 
“fragmented,”71 “divided,”72 and “divorced.”73 Even when “blended,” 
 
 67. Id. at 108. 
 68. Gillian A. Dunne, Opting into Motherhood: Lesbians Blurring the Boundaries and 
Transforming the Meaning of Parenthood and Kinship, 14 GENDER & SOC’Y 11, 25 (2000); see 
also John Bowe, Gay Donor or Gay Dad?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2006, § 6 (Magazine).  
 69. E.g., EDIN & LEIN, supra note 61; LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED: 
SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE HISTORY OF WELFARE (1994); JANE MATTES, SINGLE MOTHERS BY 
CHOICE (1994); GEOFFREY L. GREIF, SINGLE FATHERS (1985); JEAN RENVOIZE, GOING SOLO: 
SINGLE MOTHERS BY CHOICE (1985); Andrea Engber, Not Just for Single Moms . . . , SINGLE 
MOTHER, Feb. 28, 2001, at 3; Benjamin Schlesinger, Single Parent Families: A Bookshelf, 20 
MARRIAGE & FAM. REV. 463, 463 (1995). 
 70. See, e.g., INST. FOR AM. VALUES, MARRIAGE AND THE LAW: A STATEMENT OF 
PRINCIPLES 21 (2006) [hereinafter MARRIAGE AND THE LAW]; Rick Lyman, Trying to 
Strengthen an ‘I Do’ with a More Binding Legal Tie, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2005, at A1 
(covering Arkansas governor Rick Huckabee’s covenant marriage). According to Huckabee: 
Personally, I don’t think of this as tied to any political agenda . . . . I think it has much 
more to do with recognizing that we as a society are paying a huge human price 
because of broken families. With the votes on same-sex marriage last year, many states 
have said what they are against. This is an opportunity to speak out on that which we 
are for. 
Id. 
 71. See, e.g., MARRIAGE AND THE LAW, supra note 70, at 22.  
 72. See, e.g., FRANK F. FURSTENBERG & ANDREW J. CHERLIN, DIVIDED FAMILIES (1991). 
 73. E.g., HETHERINGTON & KELLY, supra note 23; ELIZABETH MARQUARDT, BETWEEN 
TWO WORLDS: THE INNER LIVES OF CHILDREN OF DIVORCE (2005); JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN 
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families are typically conceived of as nuclear, two-parent families 
different only in their presence of non-biologically-related family 
members.74 
Depictions of fractured, isolated parents and families are 
especially prominent in the current political and legal discourses 
regarding welfare. For example, this is a dominant theme in the 
“responsible fatherhood” movement, a key component of the Clinton 
administration’s welfare reforms75 which the Bush administration has 
since expanded and funded aggressively.76 As Senator Santorum 
explained in his remarks in support of the Responsible Fatherhood 
Act of 2003,77 a bill to provide state grants to encourage “responsible 
fatherhood through marriage promotion” and “responsible fatherhood 
through parenting promotion”78: 
Imagine the change in neighborhoods where 70 percent of 
kids, 80 percent of kids are born out of wedlock, and within a 
year 90 to 95 percent of those kids have no father involvement 
in their lives. Imagine the change in the neighborhood, which 
is permeated by single mothers and fathers who are attached to 
nothing except other irresponsible fathers—we call those 
gangs—or they are not attached to that neighborhood at all 
because they are in jail. Imagine the neighborhoods with 
 
ET AL., THE UNEXPECTED LEGACY OF DIVORCE: A 25 YEAR LANDMARK STUDY (2000). 
 74. See, e.g., Donna K. Ginther & Robert A. Pollak, Family Structure and Children’s 
Educational Outcomes: Blended Families, Stylized Facts, and Descriptive Regressions, 41 
DEMOGRAPHY 671, 678 (2004) (defining a blended family as one “with a biological parent who 
is married to a stepparent or with both biological parents and at least one half-sibling”). 
 75. See Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House 
Unveils New Responsible Fatherhood Initiative to Promote Work and Boost Child Support 
Payments (Jan. 26, 2000), available at http://clinton4.nara.gov/WH/New/html/20000204.html; 
see also sources cited supra note 22. 
 76. See EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., A BLUEPRINT FOR NEW 
BEGINNINGS 75–76 (2001) (describing President George W. Bush’s plan for “promoting a pro-
fatherhood agenda,” including “$60 million for competitive grants for initiatives that promote 
responsible fatherhood”), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/usbudget/blueprint/ 
blueprint.pdf. 
 77. S. 604, 108th Cong. (2003). 
 78. Id. § 3 (amending Part D of Title IV of the Social Security Act to add “Sec. 469C. 
Responsible Fatherhood Grants”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol24/iss1/5
p 47 Kessler book pages.doc  9/26/2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2007]  Community Parenting 61 
 
 
fathers in the homes. Imagine the neighborhoods with role 
models of responsible manhood and fatherhood.79 
Other than the race-laden imagery of this passage and the 
conflation of unmarried parenthood with deviance and criminality,80 
what stands out is the degree to which unmarried parents are 
imagined as isolated individuals devoid of affective ties with friends, 
social kin, or other types of family. 
Similar depictions of broken, fractured families are found in 
congressional debates surrounding efforts to enshrine opposite-sex 
marriage in the U.S. Constitution. For example, Senator Sam 
Brownback stated in support of a senate resolution proposing a 
federal marriage amendment: 
[T]he best situation for our children to be raised is in a home 
with a mother and a father. Children need these two parents. It 
is not that you can’t raise good children in a single-parent 
household; you can. Many struggle heroically to do so. . . . 
Children do best academically and socially, and they are more 
likely to be raised in financially stable homes when a mother 
and father are both present.  
 More importantly, they have the security of knowing there 
are two people in their lives who provide security and stability, 
two people who provide something, each differently, but that is 
very important.81 
These are just two statements, but they illustrate the widely 
accepted notion that individuals who live outside the married, 
heterosexual, two-parent family somehow exist in a netherworld 
beyond the family, divorced from affective relational ties. This image 
of disconnection is deployed across the spectrum in political 
 
 79. 150 CONG. REC. 3346, 3355 (2004). 
 80. See Martha Albertson Fineman, Images of Mothers in Poverty Discourses, 1991 DUKE 
L.J. 274; Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse of Fingerpointing 
as the Law’s Response to Racism, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 127 (1987) (discussing the association 
of blacks with guilt and criminality). 
 81. 152 CONG. REC. 5517, 5518–19 (daily ed. June 7, 2006) (statement of Sen. 
Brownback). 
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discourses surrounding welfare,82 cohabitation,83 divorce,84 
unmarried parenthood,85 same-sex marriage,86 and gay and lesbian 
parenthood.87 
More generally, a prominent contemporary theme in public 
discourse is that Americans are living increasingly fragmented lives; 
we are “bowling alone.”88 According to this story popularized by the 
work of political scientist Robert Putnam, individuals in American 
society belong to fewer civic organizations and attend church less 
frequently than in the past.89 Family bonds have loosened.90 
Membership in traditional women’s groups, such as local parent-
teacher associations, sports groups, professional societies, and literary 
societies, has declined steadily.91 Although Putnam cites geographic 
mobility and technology as possible causes of this diminished social 
connectedness,92 he also identifies transformations in the American 
family since the 1960s as a likely explanation: “[F]ewer marriages, 
more divorces, fewer children, lower real wages, and so on. Each of 
these changes might account for some of the slackening of civic 
engagement, since married, middle-class parents are generally more 
socially involved than other people.”93 Putnam also cites the 
movement of women “out of the home into paid employment” as a 
plausible explanation for Americans’ reduced social capital.94 
Although less virulent than much of the neo-conservative rhetoric 
about the alleged crisis of the American family,95 this softer civil 
society version also implicitly longs for a simpler time when nuclear
 
 82. See supra notes 75–79 and accompanying text. 
 83. See, e.g., CERE, supra note 43, at 25. 
 84. See MARRIAGE AND THE LAW, supra note 70, at 21, 22. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
 87. Id. 
 88. See Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital, J. 
DEMOCRACY, Jan. 1995, at 65. 
 89. Id. at 69–70.  
 90. Id. at 73.  
 91. Id. at 68, 69. 
 92. Id. at 73–74. 
 93. Id. at 75. 
 94. Id. at 74. 
 95. See, e.g., MARRIAGE AND THE LAW, supra note 70. 
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families organized around traditional gender roles fulfilled our needs 
for connection and care. 
These political discourses contrast starkly with social scientific 
accounts of the rich and varied kinship arrangements and community 
parenting practices, particularly in minority communities.96 In 
addition to naturalizing the nuclear family, these discourses hide the 
prevalence of extended kinship arrangements and community 
parenting practices in our society. As demonstrated in Part III, 
community parenting practices are also largely unrecognized in the 
law.  
III. THE LAW’S RESPONSE TO COMMUNITY PARENTING 
How has the law dealt with community parenting? There has been 
significant movement in the law toward recognizing functional 
parenthood, particularly in the more progressive states.97 However, 
current law provides virtually no means of accommodating 
community parenting, which often co-exists with functional 
parenting.  
A. The Trend Toward Functional Parenthood 
Just as marriage is increasingly understood as a relationship based 
on sentiment rather than obligation, the law has moved toward a 
functional definition of parenthood. For example, in the 1970s and 
1980s, most states enacted grandparent visitation statutes giving 
grandparents who are prevented from seeing their grandchildren by a 
custodial parent legal standing to request visitation privileges from a 
court.98 
 
 96. See supra Part II.A.  
 97. See Kessler, supra note 24, at 31–32. 
 98. See Catherine Bostock, Does the Expansion of Grandparent Visitation Rights Promote 
the Best Interests of the Child?: A Survey of Grandparent Visitation Laws in the Fifty States, 27 
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 319, 319 n.3 (1994). Even though the Supreme Court subsequently 
struck down one of the most permissive grandparent visitation statutes in the country in Troxel 
v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000), family law scholars have noted that Troxel provides very 
weak privacy protections for natural or legal custodial parents when faced by a visitation claim 
of a grandparent. See Buss, supra note 8, at 638–40. 
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Along the same lines, relatively early and widespread acceptance 
of “second-parent”99 adoption for non-biological gay and lesbian 
parents is a hallmark of the American gay rights movement.100 
Indeed, in a recent California case, the court recognized a non-
biological gay mother’s right to a second-parent adoption, even over 
the wishes of her former partner, where the adoption proceedings had 
been initiated before the couple’s separation.101 
The American Law Institute’s (ALI) Principles of the Law of 
Family Dissolution,102 a major restatement and reform effort in 
family law, recognizes functional parenthood by augmenting 
traditional definitions of parenthood based on blood and marriage 
with the concepts of the parent by estoppel and the de facto parent.103 
Parents by estoppel and de facto parents are individuals who, though 
not legal parents under state law, lived with the child for a significant 
period of time and acted in the role of parent for reasons primarily 
other than financial compensation, pursuant to an agreement with the 
legal parent, when a court finds that recognition of the individual as a 
parent is in the child's best interests.104 Although no state has 
formally adopted these ALI proposals on parenthood, many states 
have proposed them, and several state courts have recognized 
functional parents as legal parents under these and other theories.105 
 
 99. “Second-parent” adoption refers to the right of the partner of a biological parent to 
adopt without terminating the parental rights of the biological parent, thereby ensuring legal ties 
between children and both their lesbian or gay parents where the parents seek to formalize the 
relationship.  
 100. See Nancy D. Polikoff, Recognizing Partners but not Parents/Recognizing Parents but 
not Partners: Gay and Lesbian Family Law in Europe and the United States, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. 
HUM. RTS. 711, 730–38 (2000). 
 101. See Sharon S. v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 554, 574 (Cal. 2003). 
 102. See AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2002) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES]. 
 103. Id. § 2.03. 
 104. Id. Although not relevant here, some important differences exist between the two 
categories.  
 105. See, e.g., Kristine H. v. Lisa R., 117 P.3d 690, 692 (Cal. 2005) (recognizing former 
lesbian partner of biological mother as a parent pursuant to an estoppel theory); K.M. v. E.G., 
117 P.3d 673, 675, 678 (Cal. 2005) (recognizing former lesbian partner of gestational mother—
and the genetic mother of the child—as a natural mother under the Uniform Parentage Act); 
Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 670 (Cal. 2005) (recognizing former lesbian partner 
of biological mother as a “presumed parent” under the Uniform Parentage Act); In re E.L.M.C., 
100 P.3d 546, 562 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004) (recognizing former domestic partner of adoptive 
mother as a “psychological parent”); In re the Parentage of A.B., 818 N.E.2d 126, 130–33 (Ind. 
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And a couple of states have recognized functional parents by statute 
where certain conditions are met—for example, consent, holding out 
as a parent, living in the home with the child for a minimum statutory 
period, assuming significant responsibility for the day-to-day care of 
the child.106 
The reasons for these developments are complex. A breakdown of 
traditional gender norms has led to the recognition of parenting 
practices that occur in matrilineal, extended families and same-sex, 
two-parent families. Moreover, the trend toward recognizing 
functional parenthood comes at a time when cost-conscious 
policymakers are searching for ways to substitute family support for 
government assistance.107 In the latter regard, the recent expansion of 
parenthood may be understood, at least in part, as a retrograde 
development aimed at privatizing dependencies within families that 
historically were assigned to the state as part of the New Deal and 
civil and welfare rights movements.108 
Whatever the complex and contradictory reasons, in all of the 
examples discussed in this section, courts and legislatures have 
generally recognized the parental rights of a non-biological functional 
parent only where the end result sought is two legal parents—that is, 
where the second biological parent (typically a man) is not involved 
in the child’s life, or at least is not formally asserting any parental 
rights. In contrast, the law has reflected relatively uniform hostility 
toward claims of multiple parenthood.  
B. The Legal Treatment of Community Parenting Practices 
American courts and legislatures have consistently assumed and 
enforced the rule that a child shall not have more than two legal 
 
Ct. App. 2004) (recognizing former domestic partner of biological mother as a parent by 
estoppel); In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 177 (Wash. 2005) (holding that former lesbian 
partner of biological mother may be a de facto parent); In re Clifford K., 619 S.E.2d 138, 157 
(W. Va. 2005) (holding that former lesbian partner of deceased biological mother had standing 
to intervene in custody proceeding under “exceptional cases” provision). For a comprehensive 
review of the various equitable theories recognized by courts and some state legislatures, see 
Polikoff, supra note 5, at 483–509, and ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 102, § 2.03 cmts. b-c. 
 106. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270(1) (West 1999). 
 107. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 22 (discussing marriage promotion). 
 108. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH (2004). 
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parents. This can be seen in areas as diverse as child custody,109 
paternity,110 adoption,111 surrogacy,112 and child welfare law.113 In 
this part, I briefly summarize this phenomenon in one very small 
area: a subset of child custody cases involving non-marital fathers’ 
rights, surrogacy, and the dissolution of two-parent same-sex 
relationships. My goal here is to illustrate the pervasive existence of 
the two-parent norm in a narrow class of cases with the hope that the 
brief descriptions provided here can inform the ongoing debate 
regarding the numerosity requirement for parenthood. 
The first and most classic set of child custody cases involving the 
potential legal claims of more than two adults concern the rights of 
non-marital fathers. In a string of these cases, the Supreme Court 
considered the claims of non-marital, non-custodial biological fathers 
with varying degrees of prior involvement in their children’s lives 
who sought to block their child’s adoption by another man—in each 
case, the biological mother’s husband.114 Ultimately, the Court 
worked out a basic if somewhat vague rule for determining 
competing paternal claims to custody of a child in these 
circumstances: non-marital fathers can best protect their rights if they 
establish a relationship with the child and take advantage of all legal 
opportunities to be recognized as the father.115 Most would agree that 
 
 109. See, e.g., In re Jesusa V., 85 P.3d 2, 11 (Cal. 2004) (finding two presumed fathers and 
defining its task as choosing the one “which on the facts is founded on the weightier 
considerations of policy and logic”); Temple v. Meyer, 544 A.2d 629, 409–10 (Conn. 1988) 
(denying visitation, because it would be against the child’s best interests to have two father 
figures); Bodwell v. Brooks, 686 A.2d 1179, 1182 (N.H. 1996) (declining to adopt a “form of 
dual paternity” in order to allow a stepfather to pursue custody). 
 110. See N.A.H. v. S.L.S., 9 P.3d 354, 360 (Colo. 2000) (en banc) (“[A]lthough a child 
certainly can have emotional attachments to more than one father figure, she can have only one 
legal father.”). 
 111. See Pamela Gatos, Third-Parent Adoption in Lesbian and Gay Families, 26 VT. L. 
REV. 195, 196 (2001).  
 112. See discussion infra notes 132–36 and accompanying text. 
 113. Cf. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105–89, 111 Stat. 2115 
(1997) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (promoting the fast-track adoption of 
children in foster care, thereby limiting possibilities for shared parenting among foster parents, 
biological parents, and relatives). 
 114. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 
(1978); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978).  
 115. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 142–43 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(“Though different in factual and legal circumstances, these cases have produced a unifying 
theme: although an unwed father’s biological link to his child does not, in and of itself, 
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this is a sensible rule in the abstract, but it was largely conditioned on 
the assumption that a child can have only two legal parents. In 
essence, the Court defined its task as deciding the relative strength of 
two competing paternal claims where a child already has a biological 
custodial mother, no matter how strong each man’s relationship with 
the child. The cases are caged in terms of constitutional equal 
protection, due process, and liberty doctrines,116 but in the end they 
can be read as dressed up versions of the childhood game of rock, 
paper, scissors. 
The most striking example is the classic family law case of 
Michael H. v. Gerald D.,117 in which the Court rejected the 
constitutional claims of a biological, non-marital father to have 
continuing contact with his daughter. The child and her mother had 
lived on an and off with Michael H. for the first three years of the 
child’s life;118 the child referred to him as “Daddy;”119 he contributed 
to her support;120 and the child’s guardian ad litem and a court-
appointed psychologist had determined it would be in the child’s best 
interest to maintain a relationship with both her natural father and 
stepfather121 Yet, in a plurality opinion invoking the “sanctity” of the 
two-parent “unitary family,”122 as well as the importance of 
traditional gender roles (“California law, like nature itself, makes no 
provision for dual fatherhood”123), Justice Scalia rejected Michael 
H’s claims.124 The child’s independent constitutional claim to have 
continuing contact with Michael H. failed “for the same reasons.”125 
Leaving little doubt that a key issue driving the plurality was the 
specter of the more-than-two parent family, Justice Scalia limited the 
Court’s holding to the situation where the biological mother and her 
 
guarantee him a constitutional stake in his relationship with that child, such a link combined 
with a substantial parent-child relationship will do so.” (citations omitted)). 
 116. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 119, 121, 130–32 (majority opinion); Lehr, 463 U.S. at 
256, 265; Caban, 441 U.S. at 391; Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 255–56. 
 117. Michael H., 491 U.S. 110. 
 118. Id. at 113–14. 
 119. Id. at 144 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 115 (majority opinion). 
 122. Id. at 123. 
 123. Id. at 118. 
 124. Id. at 112, 132. 
 125. Id. at 131. 
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husband “both . . . wish to raise the child as the offspring of their 
union.”126 This language suggests that if the child’s biological mother 
or stepfather wished to raise her alone, that is, if the end result would 
be only two legal parents, Michael H. might have had a 
constitutionally protected interest in his relationship with his 
daughter. 
Justice Stevens, who cast the deciding vote, thought that Michael 
H. had a procedural due process right to assert his claims, but he 
found that the law in question had adequately provided that 
opportunity to him.127 In dicta, he acknowledged that “enduring 
‘family’ relationships may develop in unconventional settings.”128 
Therefore, he “would not foreclose the possibility that a 
constitutionally protected relationship between a natural father and 
his child might exist in a case like this.”129 This dicta can be read to 
suggest a constitutional requirement to recognize more than two legal 
parents in some circumstances.130 However, it has not carried any 
force in subsequent Supreme Court decisions addressing similar 
issues. 
A second set of custody cases involve disputes that arise in the 
context of alternative reproduction such as artificial insemination, in 
vitro fertilization, and surrogacy.131 In each of these situations, there 
are at least three potential parents: two biological parents who donate 
gametes and a gestational mother, as well as one or more 
“psychological” or “intended” parents. When custody disputes arise 
in these cases, courts have generally adjudicated the competing 
claims with the assumption that the final result can produce, at most, 
two legal parents. 
 
 126. Id. at 129. 
 127. Id. at 133 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 128. Id.  
 129. Id.  
 130. Justice Stevens may also have simply meant that the constitutional rights of a non-
marital father in Michael H.’s position might trump the privacy rights of an intact marital 
family, thereby fully defeating a stepfather’s parental claims. His intended meaning is 
ambiguous. 
 131. See David Adamson, Regulation of Assisted Reproductive Technologies in the United 
States, 39 FAM. L.Q. 727, 727 (2005). 
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For example, in the 1993 surrogacy case of Johnson v. Calvert,132 
the California Supreme Court was faced with competing parental 
claims of two women, the married biological mother of the child and 
a gestational surrogate. The Johnson court found that there were two 
ways to prove maternity under California’s version of the Uniform 
Parentage Act: proof of giving birth to the child or through proof of 
genetic consanguinity.133 Thus, both women could prove they were 
the mother of the child under California law. This could have resulted 
in three legal parents—the commissioning married couple who were 
biologically related to the child and the gestational surrogate. But the 
court found it necessary to add another step: when two women can 
prove they are the mother, “intention” will break the tie.134 According 
to the court, “she who intended to bring about the birth of a child that 
she intended to raise as her own—is the natural mother under 
California law.”135 Rejecting out of hand the option of enforcing the 
plain meaning of the statute, the court declared with little support or 
analysis that “California law recognizes only one natural mother.”136 
More recently, the California Supreme Court reiterated its 
commitment to the two-parent family norm, even as it expanded 
parental rights for gay and lesbian individuals. K.M. v. E.G.137 
concerned a custody dispute between former lesbian partners. Before 
their break-up, the couple utilized in vitro fertilization to conceive a 
child.138 This involved harvesting eggs from one partner, fertilizing 
them with anonymous donor sperm, and implanting them into the 
uterus of the other.139 The resulting twin children lived with the 
couple for five years.140 When their relationship dissolved, the 
gestational mother claimed that she was the sole legal parent on the 
 
 132. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993). Subsequent surrogacy cases in California have had similar 
outcomes, resulting in two legal parents at most. See In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 280, 282 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998); Marriage of Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893, 895 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1994). 
 133. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 781. 
 134. Id. at 782. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 781. 
 137. 117 P.3d 673 (Cal. 2005). 
 138. Id. at 676. 
 139. Id. at 683. 
 140. Id. 
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theory that she had always intended to be a “single mother” and had 
used her partner’s eggs only because she was unable to produce 
sufficient eggs of her own.141 She claimed that her former partner was 
a mere egg donor who had signed her parental rights away in the 
fertility center’s boilerplate gamete donation agreement.142 The 
biological mother asserted that she would not have donated her eggs 
had she known that her partner intended to be a sole parent.143 
In an opinion heralded as a victory by many in the gay and lesbian 
rights community, the California Supreme Court declined to apply 
the intent test established in Johnson v. Calvert, noting that “our 
decisions in Johnson does not preclude a child from having two legal 
parents both of whom are women” so long as the end result would 
not “leav[e] the child with three parents.”144 To be sure, this 
limitation can be read as protecting the institution of surrogacy, 
particularly where a heterosexual, married commissioning couple 
hires a surrogate as in Calvert. Especially in this context, it seems, 
the court was likely concerned with upholding the two-parent, 
nuclear family norm. At the same time, the K.M. decision also subtly 
protects the two-parent norm by treating a same-sex couple like a 
heterosexual couple where the parties conform in significant part to 
heterosexual gender roles. Consider these additional facts from K.M.: 
the gestational mother was hesitant to make a long-term commitment 
to her partner and swore her partner to secrecy about the origin of the 
eggs.145 The biological mother asserted that she learned of the 
boilerplate consent form waiving her parental rights ten minutes 
before she signed it.146 Only after the twins were born did the 
gestational mother decide to “marry” her partner.147 Significantly, 
there was no involvement of a known sperm donor who might disrupt 
the two-parent model. Given these facts, perhaps it should not be 
surprising that the court analyzed the women’s claims in status-based 
 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 681 (quoting Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 666–67 (Cal. 2005)). 
 145. Id. at 676. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
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terms, rather than relying on the more functional intent standard 
articulated in Calvert.148 
These are only a few examples from custody law of the prevailing 
legal rule that a child shall not concurrently have more than two legal 
parents. There are many others: For example, while adoption is the 
clearer and thus preferred legal avenue for recognizing non-biological 
parents, and second-parent adoption is recognized by many states,149 
“third-parent” adoption is not legally possible in our country.150 Open 
adoption comes somewhat closer to facilitating community 
parenting,151 but open adoption contracts are largely unenforceable 
when disputes arise.152 A dramatic shift in federal child welfare 
policy in the late 1990s transformed the foster care system from one 
in which children could be placed with relatives on a long-term basis 
without terminating their biological parents’ rights, to a system in 
which relatives are coerced into adopting minor relatives in their 
care.153 These policies often work to damage familial relationships 
and provide insufficient respect for the inherent strength of family 
caregiving networks, particularly in minority communities.154 There 
are exceptions to the pervasive existence of the two-parent, nuclear 
 
 148. A companion case decided the same day recognizing the existence of two legal 
mothers presented a similarly gendered fact pattern. In Elisa B., 117 P.3d 660, one partner was 
the “stay-at-home” mother and the other was the “primary breadwinner,” earning more than 
twice as much money as her partner. Id. at 663. When the couple split up, the primary 
breadwinner left the household and the stay-at-home mother retained custody of the twins. Id. 
The primary breadwinner partner supported the children for a short period, but then ceased 
support, asserting that she had no legal relationship with her former partner’s biological 
children. Id. at 670. 
 149. For a description of second-parent adoption, see supra note 99. 
 150. See Gatos, supra note 111, at 211–12. 
 151. “An open adoption is one in which the birth parents meet the adoptive parents . . . 
[and] relinquish all legal, moral, and nurturing rights to the child, but retain the right to 
continuing contact and to knowledge of the child’s whereabouts and welfare.” Annette Baran et 
al., Open Adoption, 21 SOC. WORK 97, 97 (1976). 
 152. See Annette Ruth Appell, The Move Toward Legally Sanctioned Cooperative 
Adoption: Can It Survive the Uniform Adoption Act?, 30 FAM. L.Q. 483, 484–85 (1996) (“[T]he 
Uniform Adoption Act of 1994 . . . provides no mechanism for the enforcement of post-
adoption contact agreements, except in stepparent adoptions.”). 
 153. See ROBERTS, supra note 42, at 104–33; Sacha Coupet, Swimming Upstream Against 
the Great Adoption Tide: Making the Case for “Impermanence”, 34 CAP. U. L. REV. 405, 413–
16 (2005). 
 154. See Coupet, supra note 153, at 413–16. 
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family norm in the law,155 but they are rare, at least in the United 
States. 
IV. THE TRANSFORMATIVE POTENTIAL OF COMMUNITY PARENTING 
In light of the widespread acceptance of the two-parent, nuclear 
family norm, why should the law recognize community parenting? 
There are many arguments, including the fact that community 
parenting is already widely practiced in American society.156 Failure 
to recognize it will not extinguish the practice; rather, it simply drives 
it underground. A second argument might be that establishing 
parental rights is crucial for children’s economic welfare. For 
example, the parent/child tie entitles children to health insurance, 
inheritance rights, wrongful death and other tort damages, Social 
Security benefits, and child support, among other significant 
economic rights.157 As stated previously, this may explain the 
movement within the law toward functional parenthood. 
However, the justification I want to focus on here concerns gender 
politics and the intensive mothering norms that construct the 
normative nuclear family. Specifically, I assert that community 
parenting holds great potential to break down these traditional gender 
and sexuality norms. Feminists should be deeply invested in this 
project. 
 
 155. See Jacob v. Shultz-Jacob, 923 A.2d 473, 482 (Pa. 2007) (rejecting the argument that 
only two adults could be accorded parental status in a custody dispute involving three adults 
and four children); Carbone, supra note 3, at 1341–43 (discussing provision for dual paternity 
in Louisiana law). For an insightful and compelling discussion of how family law, while not 
quite there yet, is primed for the recognition of community parenting, see Susan Frelich 
Appleton, Two Kinds of Parents (June 17, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
 156. See supra Part II.A. 
 157. See American Bar Association Section of Family Law, White Paper: An Analysis of 
The Law Regarding Same-Sex Marriage, Civil Unions, and Domestic Partnerships, 38 FAM. 
L.Q. 339, 361–62 (2004) (reviewing the economic benefits bestowed on children through legal 
parenthood). Of course, legal feminists and left legal scholars concerned with class should be 
cautious about making this argument, for it is likely to reinforce the designation of the family as 
the institution primarily responsible for economic dependency in the first place. A more radical 
agenda would be to de-link economic benefits from the family itself, for example, through a 
more robust social welfare state, universal health insurance, and child-support assurance. Such 
policies would relieve pressure to recognize family status, whether it be a same-sex marriage, 
functional parenthood involving two-parents, or community parenting.  
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Returning to the examples of community parenting discussed in 
Part II, othermothering is credited with contributing to black 
survival,158 but its significance for women’s liberation is just as great. 
As a practice, othermothering threatens both patriarchal and capitalist 
norms. Most obviously, to the extent that othermothering is defined 
by women-centered, fluid, family-like networks that have different 
purposes, othermothering undermines the patriarchal family, the 
male-breadwinner ideal, and the notion of biological motherhood. 
Perhaps less obviously, it also threatens capitalist norms, for it moves 
away from the concept of children as the private property of 
individual parents.159 
Along the same lines, gay and lesbian multiple-parent families in 
which community parenting is occurring “represent[] a radical and 
radicalizing challenge to heterosexual norms that govern parenting 
roles and identities.”160 By disconnecting family formation and 
reproduction from heterosexual relations, extended gay kin networks 
and gay parenthood reveal heterosexuality and biology to be mere 
symbols of a privileged relationship. As such, community parenting 
can be deeply transgressive and possess significant political potential. 
This account of community parenting as a positive politics contrasts 
with dominant accounts of the care practices of lower-income people, 
people of color, sexual minorities, and divorced and unmarried 
 
 158. See Kessler, supra note 24, at 19. 
 159. See PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT 182 (2d ed. 2000). Collins 
explains this point as follows: 
[S]topping to help others to whom one is not related and doing it for free can be seen 
as rejecting the basic values of the capitalist market economy.   
 . . . The traditional family ideal assigns mothers full responsibility for children and 
evaluates their performance based on their ability to procure the benefits of a nuclear 
family household. Within this capitalist marketplace model, those women who “catch” 
legal husbands, who live in single-family homes, who can afford private school and 
music lessons for their children, are deemed better mothers than those who do not. In 
this context, those African-American women who continue community-based child 
care challenge one fundamental assumption underlying the capitalist system itself: that 
children are “private property” . . . . 
Id. at 182. 
 160. See Gillian A. Dunne, Opting into Motherhood: Lesbians Blurring the Boundaries 
and Transforming the Meaning of Parenthood and Kinship, 14 GENDER & SOC’Y 11, 11 
(2000). 
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parents more generally.161 In a time when the intensive mothering 
norm is making a strong resurgence,162 these models of community 
parenting provide great potential for theorizing parenting as a 
collective project. 
V. THE LEGAL RECOGNITION OF COMMUNITY PARENTING 
How can the law better recognize community parenting? First, we 
may need to further disaggregate the bundle of parental rights. 
Currently, it is all or nothing. You are in or out—a legal parent or a 
stranger. There are advantages and disadvantages to this framework. 
The existing debate on that question is likely to change, or at least 
certainly to become more intense, once we add more potential 
claimants to the mix.163 Putting that important debate aside for the 
moment, what follows is a very brief exploration of a few concrete 
legal reforms that might follow if we were to recognize community 
parenting in the law. 
Most obviously, were community parenting recognized as a 
legitimate practice, more than two adults could establish legal ties to 
a child. There are a number of ways this could be achieved, including 
third-parent adoption, co-guardianships, contracts, and post hoc 
judicial determinations. While the United States has yet to enter this 
territory in any serious way, other countries are moving in that 
direction. 
For example, the Court of Appeal for Ontario recently granted 
legal parental status to a child’s biological mother and her lesbian 
partner without extinguishing the parental rights of the child’s 
biological father.164 In that case, the three adults agreed that the 
women partners would be the child’s primary parents, but that the 
father would play an active role in the child’s life.165 The non-
 
 161. See supra Part II.B. 
 162. See Lisa Belkin, The Opt-Out Revolution, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2003, § 6 (Magazine), 
at 42. According to this article, “Why don’t women run the world? . . . [B]ecause they don’t 
want to.” Id. at 45. 
 163. For a strong statement in support of the “all or nothing” model of parental rights, see 
Buss, supra note 8. 
 164. See A.A. v. B.B., [2007] 83 O.R.3d 561 (Can.) 
 165. Id. at para. 1. 
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biological mother sought a judicial declaration that she, along with 
child’s biological parents, was one of the child’s legal parents.166 
Using its parens patriae power the court held it would not be in the 
child’s best interest to lose the parentage of any of the parties.167 
Ultimately, the court declared the non-biological mother a legal 
parent without diminishing the status of either biological parent.168  
Even before this case, Canadian courts could order more than one 
non-custodial parent to pay child support concurrently (for example, 
a biological father and a stepfather) if the non-biological parent stood 
in the place of a parent to the child,169 apportioning support according 
to the role each adult played in the child’s life or even applying the 
full guideline amount to each adult independently.170 This rule seems 
justified in light of the fact that a whole range of individuals often 
have economic and affective ties to a child that are worth 
preserving.171 Recognizing such care practices, which can be highly 
functional, would represent long-deserved recognition of the value of 
that care.  
Or perhaps a more robust welfare state, in which both the state 
and a set of individuals would be jointly responsible for a child, 
would be the logical consequence of a society in which community 
parenting were recognized. A deeper commitment to community 
parenting might also involve a recognition that much parenting in our 
society occurs outside the family itself, “between home and 
school.”172 Other law reforms that might follow, in one form or 
another, from a commitment to community parenting include open 
adoption and a foster care system where parental rights are not 
 
 166. Id. at para. 2. 
 167. Id. at para. 37. 
 168. Id. at para. 41. 
 169. See Chartier v. Chartier, [1999] S.C.R. 242, 246 (Can.) (holding that a stepparent who 
stands in the place of a parent to a child cannot unilaterally give up that status and escape the 
obligation to provide support for that child after the breakdown of the marriage). 
 170. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE CANADA, CHILDREN COME FIRST: A REPORT TO PARLIAMENT 
REVIEWING THE PROVISIONS AND OPERATION OF THE FEDERAL CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES 
49–50 (2002), http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/ps/sup/pub/rp/volume_2.pdf. In many provinces, 
this rule has been extended to individuals in cohabiting relationships, making the act of 
parenting (not marital status or the existence of other obligors) the determining factor in child 
support determinations. Id. at 17. 
 171. See supra Part II.A. 
 172. Laura Rosenbury, Between Home and School, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 833 (2007).  
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terminated on a fast track, but are shared with foster parents 
consistent with a child’s welfare. 
Obviously these reforms would implicate serious issues regarding 
family privacy, gender politics, and the best interests of children. 
Indeed, such reforms may involve reworking certain constitutional 
principles concerning the family.173 Two points are worth making in 
that regard. First, the constitutional background rules that would 
allegedly constrain a greater recognition of community parenting are 
themselves a product of a set of power relations. Reconstructing such 
constitutional doctrines to more fully recognize, value, and protect 
community parenting practices could result in a less partial and 
distorted legal regime. Second, there remains ample room for 
revision of existing constitutional doctrines regulating family and 
intimate life without elevating sperm donors, mere ex-lovers, and 
babysitters to the status of parent. Because such a law reform project 
would require careful line drawing, it would be a delicate and 
difficult one, but it should be achievable nevertheless.174 
Needless to say, this is a long-term project. The movement toward 
recognizing functional parents—even in its two-parent iteration—has 
garnered a negative response by family law scholars from the 
religious right to the liberal center. For example, Emily Buss and 
others have argued that recognizing functional parents harms children 
by undermining legal parents’ authority.175 June Carbone has 
suggested that recognizing functional parents ex post through 
equitable doctrines unfairly imposes obligations on people who did 
not agree to them.176 Lynne Wardle says that functional parenthood—
and the ALI Principles more generally—will weaken and undermine 
the institution of marriage.177 Robyn Wilson raises the problem of 
sexual abuse of children, arguing that functional parenthood provides 
 
 173. But cf. Meyer, supra note 6 (arguing that there is no contradiction between functional 
parenthood and constitutional privacy, at least when only two legal parents are the final 
outcome in a particular case). 
 174. See, e.g., In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546, 562 (Colo. 2004) (finding that even though 
legal mother had a constitutionally protected parental right and her ex-domestic partner did not, 
the state had a compelling interest in protecting the child from the harm that would result from 
termination of her relationship with her psychological parent). 
 175. See Buss, supra note 8, at 647–48. 
 176. See Carbone, supra note 3, at 1304–06. 
 177. See Wardle, supra note 2, at 1233. 
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more potentially predatory adults with access to children.178 Given 
this uphill battle on the threshold question of functional parenthood, 
one can see why proponents of functional parenthood may succumb 
to the impulse to construct community parenting as the deviant, 
dysfunctional “other”—much in the same way that proponents of 
same-sex marriage have worked so hard to distinguish polygamy.179 
Notably missing in these discussions is any consideration of gender 
politics, despite the fact that court decisions enforcing the two-parent 
numerosity requirement in law scream with traditional gender 
ideology.180 
It is incumbent upon legal feminists to take advantage of this 
potentially transformative moment. Slowly but surely, the law is 
moving in the direction of recognizing functional parents. Explicitly 
injecting the possibility of community parenting into the current 
discourse on functional parenthood carries great potential to 
undermine traditional gender and sexuality norms of the family. Of 
course, community parenting will not necessarily always serve to 
disrupt oppressive gender and sexuality norms. Indeed, in certain 
contexts, the assertion of parental rights by a third or fourth person 
may be a product of gender oppression. At the same time, the 
circumstances of community parenting can make gender 
transformation possible, at least to a greater extent than has been 
recognized in political, legal, and academic discourses. This is a 
feminist project worth pursuing. 
 
 178. See generally Wilson, supra note 12. 
 179. See Elise Soukup, Polygamists, Unite!, NEWSWEEK, May 20, 2006, at 52; see also 
Sarah Elizabeth Richards, Polygamy Loves Company, SALON.COM, Mar. 21, 2006,  
http://www.salon.com/mwt/broadsheet/2006/03/21/polygamy_activists/print.html?source=news
letter. 
 180. This observation is inspired in part by Susan Frelich Appleton, Missing in Action? 
Searching for Gender Talk in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 97 
(2005). 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
